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Abstract 
 
The Coordinate Price Pressure Index (CPPI) measures the incentives of two competitors to engage in a 
particular type of Parallel Accommodating Conduct (PAC). Specifically, it measures the incentives of a 
leader firm to initiate a unilateral percentage price increase, with the expectation that a follower firm 
will match it. Using a large set of simulated markets, we measure the accuracy of the index in terms of 
predicting the impact of a merger on firms’ incentives to engage in PAC. Results suggest that the CPPI 
only displays a fair performance when predicting an increase in firm’s incentives to engage in PAC, 
and only in mergers in which the diversion ratio between the target and the acquiring firm is low. 
However, the index displays a poor performance when predicting mergers with a significant 
anticompetitive effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the performance of the Coordinate Price Pressure Index (CPPI) 
introduced by Moresi et al. (2011)  The index measures the incentives of two competitors to engage in 
a specific type of tacit coordination strategy  by which a leader firm increases its price by a certain 
percentage, expecting that a follower firm will observe this change and will match it by exactly the 
same percentage. This specific conduct is considered as a form of Parallel Accommodating Conduct 
(PAC, herein).  
As explained by Harrington (2013), a PAC could lead firms to reach a supra-competitive 
outcome. Nevertheless, this conduct requires some kind of retaliation or deterrence mechanism in 
order to be successfully implemented by firms. The game considered by Moresi et al. (2011) is in line 
with this argumentation. Indeed, the CPPI is derived from a simple model of repeated interaction 
between two firms, which explicitly considers monitoring and retaliation. The game is built as follows: 
(i) in a certain period 𝑡, a leading firm increases its price by a given percentage; (ii) in the subsequent 
period 𝑡 + 1 a follower firm observes the price increase and decides whether to match it or not; (iii) if 
matching occurs, the price increase becomes permanent. However, if there is no matching, the leading 
firm reverses its price to the initial level, with the promise of not initiating any further attempt to 
engage in PAC. 
We build a set of 50,000 simulated markets. The demand is derived from a logit discrete choice 
model with random coefficients. The supply side is composed by a set of heterogeneous single-
product firms that offer differentiated products and compete in prices. The initial level of prices 
(hereinafter, equilibrium prices) is obtained by computing the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. 
In each simulated market, we consider the engagement in PAC by two firms (say A and B ), , and 
compute both the percentage price increase initiated by Firm A and the percentage price increase 
initiated by Firm B that would maximize the present value of each firm’s future expected profits 
(assuming that this price increase will be matched by its competitor). We define the Actual Coordinate 
Price Pressure (ACPP) as the minimum of these two percentage price increases. In this sense, this 
measure can be seen as the lower bound of the supra-competitive prices that two firms could reach 
through PAC.  
The next step is to simulate a merger between one of these firms (A for instance), the acquiring 
firm, and a third firm (say C ), the acquired or target firm. Under this new scenario, we re-compute the 
ACPP, but considering the fact that the acquiring firm in willing to initiate and to follow a PAC by 
increasing the price of its two products (i.e., its original product plus the product acquired after the 
merger). The impact of the merger on firms’ actual incentives to engage in PAC is measured as the 
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variation of the ACPP induced by the acquisition, and this variation is used as the benchmark to 
measure the performance of the CPPI.  
Note that we use a modified version of the CPPI. The baseline index proposed by Moresi et al. 
(2011) considers the percentage price increase that leaves the leader firm indifferent between 
increasing and not increasing its price (i.e., just-profitable variation). While the index used in this 
paper considers the percentage price increase that maximizes the present value of firms` expected 
profits (i.e., profit-maximizing variation). However, as already stated by Moresi et al. (2011), in 
practice this difference is translated into a minor adjustment with respect to the baseline index. Indeed 
the index built under the profit-maximization assumption is equal to one half of the index build under 
the just-profitable variation assumption.1 
The accuracy of the index is measured in two situations: (i) its ability to correctly predict the 
sign of the change (ACPP > 0% or ACPP ≤ 0%), and (ii), its ability to identify mergers that generate a 
significant anticompetitive impact (ACPP > 5% or ACPP ≤ 5%). We measure the percentage of cases in 
which the index leads us to incur in Type I or Type II errors. As usual, a Type I error denotes a case in 
which the index erroneously identifies a merger as anticompetitive, when is not. While a Type II error 
refers to the case in which index fails to identify an anticompetitive merger. 
First, regarding the direction of change, results suggest that the CPPI only displays a fair 
performance, and only for mergers involving firms with low diversion ratios between their products. 
Second, the results suggest that the CPPI displays a poor performance forpredicting mergers that 
generate a significant increase of firms’ incentives to engage in PAC. While the percentage of cases 
with a Type I error is almost zero, the percentage of cases where the index incurs in a Type II error is 
considerably high. The reason is that the index consistently underestimates the magnitudes of the 
actual ACPP variations. We believe that the cause of this problem is that the index omits important 
information regarding the strategic interactions between the products sold by the merging parties. 
Indeed, the index does not consider any of the diversion rations between the acquiring and the target 
firms. Indeed, when the acquiring firm decides to increase its prices, a part of the diverted sales from 
one product is captured by its other product, and vice versa. Thus, the higher the diversion ratios 
between the products of the acquiring and target firms, the lower the cost of initiating a PAC. 
Therefore, not considering this information is likely to lead to an underestimation of the impact of a 
merger.  
This paper is related to the economic literature that uses simulation methods to measure the 
performance of screening tools designed to predict the potential anticompetitive effects of mergers. In 
                                                          
1 See Section II.C.3 of Moresi et al. (2011). 
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this vein, Foncel, Ivaldi and Khimich (2014) assess the accuracy of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and the Upward Price Pressure (UPP) index in terms of predicting anticompetitive unilateral 
effects of mergers. Note that we borrow the simulation setting designed by Foncel et al. (2014). 
Similarly, Miller, Remer, Ryan and Sheu (2017) use Monte Carlo experiments to measure the accuracy 
of the UPP index to predict price effects of mergers. However, the literature on the evaluation of 
screening tools designed to gauge anticompetitive coordinated effects is still limited. Ivaldi and Lagos 
(2017) use simulated markets to characterize the risk of coordinated effects (defined as the incentives 
of firms to collude on the vector of prices that maximizes industry profits), and identify cases in which 
diversion ratios or cross-price elasticities can be used to screen anticompetitive mergers. However, the 
accuracy of these tools is not measured. Thus, to the best of our knowledge there are no papers 
measuring the accuracy of screening tools designed to measure the impact of coordinated effects. The 
CPPI has been the first index proposed for this purpose. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the index proposed by 
Moresi et al. (2011). Section 3 explains the simulation approach. Section 4 displays the main results. 
Finally, Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2. The CPPI index 
 
2.1 Pre-merger case 
 
The PAC strategy consists on a game in which two (or more) competitors engage in a coordinated 
price increase without the need of explicit communication between them. In particular, a leader firm 
increases its price by a certain percentage with the expectation that at least one of its competitors will 
accommodate and follow a similar strategy. The game is defined as follows. First, in period t Firm A 
raises its price by a percentage equal to SA for at least two periods. Second, in period t + 1 Firm B 
decides whether to match the price increase or not, and if it finally decides to increase, it would do it 
by increasing its price by the exact same percentage. Third, in period t + 2,there are two possible 
results: If Firm B has decided in t+1 to match the price increase, then the change becomes permanent 
for both firms; if Firm B has decided not to match the price increase, then Firm A returns to its initial 
price level and commits to not initiating further attempts to engage in a PAC. 
Moresi et al. (2011) propose an index that captures firm’s incentives to participate in the 
pricing strategy described in the preceding paragraph. This index is based on the maximum 
percentage price increase that a firm is willing to initiate (i.e., just-profitable variation). However, we 
choose to study a variation of this original index. Namely, we use the percentage price increase that 
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maximizes the firm’s expected profits from initiating a PAC (i.e., profit-maximizing variation). In 
practice, this latter percentage is just equal to one half of the percentage considered by the original 
index.2 The percentage price increase that Firm A is willing to initiate is given by; 
 
 SA
I =
δFBA−θA
1−δFBA
×
mA
2
, (1) 
 
with FBA =
DRBAqBeB
qAeA
 and  θA = 1 −
1
mAeA
. Sales volumes of products sold by Firms A and B are given by 
qA and qB, respectively. The term mA is the initial percentage margin charged by Firm A, and eA and 
eB are the own-price elasticities of Firms A and B, respectively. The parameter δ is the inter-temporal 
discount rate, which is assumed to be equal for every firm in the market. The term DRBA is the 
diversion ratio from Firm B  to Firm A. 
The cost/benefit trade-off faced by Firm A when initiating a price increase SA
I  at period t is 
captured by the term FBA. The numerator represents the size of diverted sales from Firm B that Firm A 
would capture if Firm B decides to match the price increase (from period t + 1 onwards), while the 
denominator provides the size of diverted sales from Firm A generated by the price increase (from 
period t onwards). In addition, the term θA measures potential deviations of Firm A with respect to 
equilibrium prices. Indeed, in equilibrium, it has to be the case that mAeA = 1 and θA = 0. Therefore, 
when Firm A is already pricing above the equilibrium, its incentives to initiate a price increase are 
reduced (0 < θA < 1). 
The percentage price increase that Firm B (i.e., defined as SB
I ) is willing to initiate is obtained 
by an identical procedure and it mirrors Equation (1). 
Finally, the pre-merger CPPI is given by; 
 
 CPPIAB = min{SA
I , SB
I  }. (2) 
 
Note that, as explained by Moresi et al. (2011), the percentage price increase that a firm is 
willing to follow is always higher that the percentage price increase that a firm is willing to initiate. 
Thus, the CPPIAB captures the lower bound of the range of percentage price increases that two Firms A 
and B could sustain through PAC. 
 
 
                                                          
2 The mathematical derivations of both indexes are presented in the Technical Appendix of Moresi et al. (2011). 
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2.2 Post-merger variation 
 
The purpose is to measure the change in Firms A and B incentives to engage in PAC, after the 
acquisition of a third Firm C. Thus, assuming that Firm A (the acquiring firm) merges with Firm C (the 
acquired or target firm), we re-build the post-merger index considering the exact same set of 
assumptions used by Moresi et al. (2011). Specifically, these are: 
1. The term ∆Si
I is measured with respect to the pre-merger price level. 
2. The index abstracts from any unilateral effects.3  
3. The merged firm (or Firm AC) raises the prices of all its products by the same percentage;  
4. The post-merger sales volume of Firm AC is equal to the sum of the pre-merger sales of the 
merging parties; 
5. The diversion ratio from Firm B to Firm AC is equal to the sum of the pre-merger diversion 
ratios DRBA and  DRBC; 
The diversion ratio from Firm AC to Firm B is equal to the diverted sales from Firm AC that 
are captured by Firm B after a uniform price increase of both products sold by the merged 
firm.4 
6. The product sold by Firm C has the same price and margin than the product sold by Firm 
A. Thus, after the acquisition, Firm AC faces the same elasticity, price and margin for both 
products.  
Under these assumptions, the post-merger percentage price increase that Firm AC is willing to initiate 
is given by: 
 
 SAC
I =
δFB,AC−θA
1−δFB,AC
×
mA
2
           with         FB,AC =
(DRBA+DRBC)qBeB
(qA+qC)eA
, (3) 
 
                                                          
3 As Moresi et al. (2011) point it out, the purpose of the CPPI index is to gauge the effect of a merger on firms` 
incentives to engage in PAC, and not to capture the overall upward pricing pressure caused by all causes. 
4 We approximate this diversion ratio by the following expression: DRAC,B =
∂qB
∂pA
+
∂qB
∂pC
∂qA
∂pA
+
∂qC
∂pC
. All derivatives are computed 
using pre-merger prices and market shares. Note that, as a simplification assumption, the denominator in 𝐷𝑅𝐴𝐶,𝐵 
does not consider the cross-price derivatives between products of the merging parties, which represents the 
fraction of diverted sales that would be re-captured by the merged firm. Indeed, a modified version of this 
diversion ratio that considers this latter effect is given by: 𝐷𝑅𝐴𝐶,𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
∂qB
∂pA
+
∂qB
∂pC
(
∂qA
∂pA
−
∂qA
∂pC
)+(
∂qC
∂pC
−
∂qC
∂pA
)
. As a robustness check, later 
we use 𝐷𝑅𝐴𝐶,𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ instead of DRAC,B, and show that results are robust to this change. Note that all derivatives in these 
formulas are expressed in absolute values. 
  
7 
 
while the post-merger percentage price increase that Firm B is willing to initiate is given by: 
 
 S̅B
I =
δFAC,B−θB
1−δFAC,B
×
mB
2
           with       FAC,B =
DRAC,B(qA+qC)eA
qBeB
. (4) 
 
Note that Equations (3) and (4) are derived from our own interpretation of Moresi et al. (2011), 
since the authors do not present an explicit equation for the post-merger CPPI in the paper.5 
Finally, the impact of a merger between Firms A and C on the incentives of Firms A and B to 
engage in PAC is given by: 
 
 ∆CPPIAC,B = min{SAC
I , S̅B
I } − CPPIAB. (5) 
   
3. Simulations of the Actual Coordinated Price Pressure 
 
 
We simulate 50,000 markets, with 10,000 consumers and 5 single-brand firms in each of them. It is 
assumed that consumer preferences behave according to a model of discrete choice demand with 
random coefficients. In addition, we assume that firms offer products with differentiated 
characteristics or attributes, including a continuous one and a discrete one. Firms have heterogeneous 
and constant marginal costs of production and compete in prices. Under the absence of collusion or 
PAC, prices are determined in each period by the one-shot Nash equilibrium. Using this approach, it 
is ensured that the simulated markets exhibit a much more realistic pattern of own and cross-price 
elasticities. (See Nevo, 2000.) In addition, having both continuous and discrete quality attributes 
renders the model more general, and allows us to capture a wider range of preferences. (See Grigolon 
and Verboven, 2014.) For further details regarding the simulation setting see Appendix A. 
In each market we simulate a PAC strategy between Firms A and B.6 The actual percentage 
price increases, that firms involved in the PAC strategy are willing to initiate, are computed by 
maximizing the sum of firms present and future stream of expected payoffs, assuming that the 
competitor matches the price increase. This actual percentage price increase is denoted by 𝑆𝑖
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 . 
                                                          
5 Moresi et al. (2011) mention that the post-merger index can be computed using the pre-merger formulas, but 
considering the following adjustments: (i) larger sales volume for the merged firm, (ii) a higher diversion ratio 
from Firm B to the merged firm, and (iii) a revised diversion ratio from the merged firm to Firm B. In our 
interpretation of these adjustments, and considering the set of assumptions listed above, we modify the pre-
merger formulas by considering: (i) a sales volume for the merged firm equal to 𝑞𝐴 + 𝑞𝐶 , (ii) a diversion ratio from 
Firm B to the merged firm equal to 𝐷𝐵,𝐴𝐶 = 𝐷𝐵,𝐴 + 𝐷𝐵,𝐶, and (iii) the revised diversion ratio from the merged firm 
to Firm B presented in Assumption (6) above. 
6 The discount factor 𝛿 is assumed to be equal to 0.9. 
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Therefore, we observe two percentage price increases, i.e., those that Firm A (i.e., 𝑆𝐴
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙) and Firm B 
(i.e., 𝑆𝐵
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙). would be willing to initiate.  The derivation of 𝑆𝑖
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  is presented in Appendix B. 
In this setting, the Actual Coordinate Price Pressure (i.e., 𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟) is defined as the 
minimum of these two values, i.e, 𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐵
𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 = min{SA
I,Actual, SB
I,Actual }. In other words, the 
𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟  represents the actual lower bound of supra-competitive prices that Firms A and B 
could reach through a PAC strategy. It is opposed to the predicted threshold provided by the CPPI) 
In the next step, we simulate the impact of a merger between Firm A (acquiring firm) and Firm 
C (target firm) on firms’ incentives to engage in PAC. Specifically, we re-compute the percentage price 
increase that Firm A is willing to initiate after acquiring Firm C, the merged entity being called Firm 
AC), assuming that it would apply the same percentage increase for both products. This value is 
denoted as 𝑆𝐴𝐶
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙. At the same time, we re-compute the percentage price increase that Firm B is 
willing to initiate, assuming that it will be followed by the two products of the merged firm. This 
percentage is denoted by 𝑆?̅?
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 . The derivations of 𝑆𝐴𝐶
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  and 𝑆?̅?
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  are presented in Appendix 
B. 
The post-merger ACPP (i.e., 𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟) is then defined as the minimum of these two 
adjusted percentage price increases, i.e., 𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐶,𝐵
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 = min{SAC
I,Actual, 𝑆?̅?
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙}. The impact of the 
merger is measured as the change in the ACPP (i.e., ∆𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃 = 𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 − 𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒−𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟). 
Thus, a positive change in ACPP, i.e.,  ∆𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃, represents an increase of the lower bound of prices that 
two firms can reach through PAC, and it can be considered as an anticompetitive effect generated by a 
merger. 
However, an additional adjustment is made to the simulated price increase initiated by the 
acquiring firm post-merger. Since we are evaluating the impact of the merger with respect to the pre-
merger level of prices, we need to adjust for the potential presence of unilateral effects. In order to do 
so, we compute the percentage price increase (which is denoted as 𝑆𝐴𝐶
𝑈 ). that the merged firm is willing 
to unilaterally initiate, even if there are no competitors willing to match it. Thus, the post-merger price 
increase initiated by the acquiring firm and motivated exclusively by PAC is obtained as follows: 
 
 
In other words: 
Percentage price 
increase exclusively 
motivated by PAC 
(SAC
I,Adjusted
) 
 = 
Percentage price increase 
initiated by the merged firm 
and followed by a third 
competitor (SAC
I,Actual) 
Percentage price increase 
that the merger firm 
would unilaterally initiate 
(𝑆𝐴𝐶
𝑈 ) 
   - 
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Note that it is assumed that competitors that are not involved in the PAC strategy do not react 
and keep their prices at the pre-merger Nash equilibrium level. In addition, we are restricting the 
unilateral effects to be a percentage price increase equally applied to all the products offered by the 
merged firm. However, the post-merger level of Nash equilibrium prices does not necessarily satisfy 
this condition. For more details regarding the maximization problem necessary to obtain the pre-
merger and post-merger values of the ACCP, please refer to the Appendix B. 
Table 3 summarizes the main descriptive statistics of the set of simulated markets. There are 
already two interesting results that can be deduced from this table. First, on average, the CPPI 
significantly underestimates the actual impact of the merger on firms’ incentives to engage in PAC. 
Second, as predicted by Moresi et al. (2011), the merger can actually reduce firms’ incentives to engage 
in PAC (i.e. a negative change in ACPP). Indeed, the ACPP change is negative in 13.57% of the sample.   
 
Table 3 - Summary statistics of the simulated markets 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Own-price elasticity Firm A -3.482956 1.171715 -24.35604 -0.4310398 
Own-price elasticity Firm B -3.482887 1.169006 -25.7864 -0.2349229 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C to Firm A) 0.1683257 0.1246738 0.000008 0.7511157 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C to Firm B) 0.1720856 0.1252642 0.000011 0.737363 
HHI pre-merger 2769.439 702.6352 2000.255 9441.809 
Predicted HHI variation 710.6348 581.8557 0.1590207 4890.431 
ACPP pre-merger 0.0456778 0.1350181 -0.000457 21.44375 
ACPP variation 0.0402753 0.153141 -2.213478 10.89305 
CPPI pre-merger 0.0213234 0.0369831 -0.4044157 0.5667104 
CPPI variation (*) 0.0068188 0.0549253 -2.449458   0.3343301 
Number of observations (**) 46,093 
Note: (*) It only considers observations with a CPPI variation higher than -2.5 
(**) We do not consider 3,907 observations in which the fixed-point algorithm used to compute Nash equilibrium 
prices does not converge to a solution after 200 iterations, or observations in which the equilibrium market share of at 
least one of the firms is equal to zero. 
 
 
 
4. Performance of the CPPI 
 
Figure 4.1 contains a set of scatter-graphs displaying the relationship between the value predicted by 
the index (∆CPPIAC,B) and the actual variation of firms’ incentives to engage in PAC (∆ACPPAC,B). The 
sample is classified in four groups, according to the actual value of the diversion ratio from the target 
firm (Firm C) to the acquiring firm (Firm A). For instance, the upper left panel displays the scatter plot 
PAC effect = Overall Effect Unilateral Effects   - 
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of the observations under the 25th percentile value of 𝐷𝑅𝐶𝐴. It is clear to conclude, from a visual 
examination of the graphs in Figure 4.1, that the index has a better predictive power for those 
acquisitions with lower values of this diversion ratio. 
One explanation for the existence of this asymmetry is that the index omits the information 
provided by the diversion ratios between the products offered by the merged firm. Indeed, when Firm 
A is evaluating to initiate a post-merger PAC with Firm B, it has to consider the cost of unilaterally 
initiating a price increase (i.e., the value of total diverted sales), which will be reduced if a larger 
fraction of its diverted sales are captured by Firm 𝐴. Thus, the higher the diversion ratios between the 
merging parties’ products, the lower the cost of initiating a PAC, and thus the higher the impact of the 
merger on the acquiring firm’s incentives to initiate such a conduct. Therefore, for higher values of the 
merging parties’ diversion ratios, the index is likely to underestimate the real impact of the merger 
and becomes less accurate. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 displays the empirical distribution of the ratio between the predicted variation of 
the percentage price increase that the acquiring firm is willing to initiate (i.e., ∆SA
I = SAC
I − SA
I ), and its 
actual variation (i.e., ∆SA
I,Actual = SAC
I,Actual − SA
I,Actual). In other words, it shows the percentage of the 
actual variation that is explained by the CPPI. As shown in the graphs of Figure 4.2, for higher values 
of the diversion ratio from the acquired firm (Firm C) to the acquiring firm (Firm A), the distribution is 
centered around 0 (zero). This fact has two implications. First, the index consistently underestimates 
Figure 4.1 – Predicted (∆𝐂𝐏𝐏𝐈) and actual (∆𝐀𝐂𝐏𝐏) variation of firms’ 
incentives to engage in PAC, by different values of 𝑫𝑹𝑪𝑨 (*) 
 
-.
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∆CPPI 
(*) Each pX-pY pair represents the range of values in between percentiles X and 
Y of the diversion ratio 𝐷𝑅𝐶,𝐴 
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the actual price variation (if the prediction was accurate, the distribution would be centered around 1). 
Second, for higher values of the diversion ratio, the index predicts the wrong direction (or sign) of the 
change on a high percentage of the cases in the sample (if the prediction was accurate, the value of the 
ratio would be always positive).  
 
Result 1 
For high values of the diversion ratio between the products offered by the target and acquiring firmq 
(i.e., 𝐷𝑅𝐶𝐴), the CPPI tends to consistently underestimate the actual impact of the merger on the 
merged firm incentives to engage in PAC and to be significantly less accurate when predicting the 
direction of this change. 
 
 
  
4.1 Predicting an increase in firms incentives to engage in PAC  
 
 
To study the performance of the CPPI when predicting the direction of change, the sample is classified 
in two groups: cases with ∆ACPP > 0% (anticompetitive merger) and cases with ∆ACPP ≤ 0% (absence 
of anticompetitive effects). Then we measure the percentage of cases in which the index leads us to 
incur a Type I error or a Type II error. A Type I error refers to cases in which the index erroneously 
Figure 4.2 – Distribution of 
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classifies a merger as potentially anticompetitive (i.e., ∆CPPI > 0%) when it is not (i.e., ∆ACPP ≤ 0%.); 
a Type II error corresponds to cases in which the index fails to detect an anticompetitive merger (i.e., 
∆CPPI ≤ 0%, and ∆ACPP > 0%). Table 4.1 summarizes the results. It can be seen that, in terms of cases 
displaying a Type II error, the CPPI displays a fair performance for mergers with a low value of the 
diversion ratio DRCA; however, the number of cases with a Type I error is still significant. 
Table C.1 in Appendix C replicates the results displayed in Table 4.1, but using DRAC,B̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
(instead of 𝐷𝑅𝐴𝐶,𝐵) to compute S̅B
I  in Equation (4). Results are robust to this change. 
 
Table 4.1 – Accuracy of the CPPI: predicting the sign of the change 
Diversion Ratio (DRCA) ∆ACPP ≤ 0% ∆ACPP > 0% 
Percentile Freq. Type-I error Freq. Type-II error 
25% 2,483 24.77% 9,040 12.88% 
50% 2,255 11.84% 9,268 15.47% 
75% 1,176 8.67% 10,347 29.11% 
100% 343 21.87% 11,181 38.85% 
Total 6,257 16.93% 39,836 24.99% 
 
 
Result 2 
In term of predicting a positive ACPP change (i.e., an anticompetitive effect), the CPPI displays a fair 
performance only in mergers with low values of the diversion ratio between the products offered by the 
target and the acquiring firm (i.e., a low 𝐷𝑅𝐶𝐴). However, even in these cases, the probability of 
incurring in a Type I error is still significant. 
 
 
 
4.2  Identifying mergers that generate a significant increase in firms incentives to 
engage in PAC  
 
 
To study the performance of the CPPI in terms of identifying mergers that generate a significant 
increase in firms incentives to engage in PAC, the sample is classified in two groups: cases with 
∆ACPP > 5% and cases with ∆ACPP ≤ 5%. As before, we measure the percentage of cases in which the 
index leads us to incur in a Type I error (i.e., ∆CPPI > 5%, and ∆ACPP ≤ 5%), and in a Type II error 
(i.e., ∆CPPI ≤ 5%, and ∆ACPP > 5%). Table 4.2 summarizes these results. The occurrence of cases with 
a Type I error is substantially low (0.41% of the total number of cases) and stable across the sample. 
Nevertheless, the accuracy of the index in terms of detecting anticompetitive cases is quite poor. 
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Indeed, the index displays a Type II error in 75.08% of the markets, and in almost 100% of the markets 
with mergers involving products with high values of the diversion ratio (from Firm C to Firm A). 
Table C.2 in Appendix C replicates the results displayed in Table 4.2, but using DRAC,B̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
(instead of 𝐷𝑅𝐴𝐶,𝐵) to compute S̅B
I  in Equation (4). Results are almost identical to the ones presented in 
this section. 
 
Table 4.2 – Accuracy of the CPPI: predicting a significant variation of the ACPP 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C / Firm 
A) 
∆ACPP ≤ 5% ∆ACPP > 5% 
Percentiles Freq. Type-I error Freq. Type-II error 
25% 8,453 0.70% 3,070 56.09% 
50% 9,420 0.73% 2,103 71.56% 
75% 9,832 0.17% 1,691 86.16% 
100% 8,990 0.07% 2,534 97.32% 
Total 36,695 0.41% 9,398 76.08% 
 
Result 3 
The CPPI displays a poor performance when detecting mergers that generate a significant 
anticompetitive impact (i.e., ∆𝐴𝐶𝑃𝑃 > 5%) on firms’ incentives to engage in PAC.  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
 
We test the accuracy of the CPPI within a simulated environment, considering a system of non-linear 
demands and a supply side composed by heterogeneous firms that compete in prices. The results 
suggest that the index displays a poor performance for predicting significant changes on firm’s 
incentives to engage in PAC. There are two potential explanations for this result.  First, the CPPI is 
derived from a model with linear demands. Thus, it is expected that its accuracy is reduced in a model 
based on non-linear demands. Second, the CPPI does not consider the strategic interactions between 
the merged firm’s products. Indeed, the cost of initiating a PAC may be reduced because a fraction of 
diverted sales from one product are captured by the other products offered by the merged firm. 
Therefore, not considering this positive externality may lead us to inaccurate predictions.  
Recently, Moresi et al. (2015) propose a new index (called cGUPPI) that considers all the cross-
price effects of firms involved in a PAC strategy; hence, it should outperform the CPPI index in terms 
of identifying mergers with a signficant anticompetitive impact on firms incentives to engage in PAC. 
However, the construction of this index requires a larger set of information. . An alternative approach 
is given by merger simulation models, which requires a similar information set as input, and may 
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result in more accurate predictions (see for instance, Björnerstedt and Verboven, 2016, for the case of 
unilateral effects, Brito et al., 2013, and Ivaldi and Lagos, 2017,  for the case of coordinated effects).  
 
 
 
Appendix A – Simulation setting 
 
Discrete choice demand with random coefficients 
We consider a set of 𝑁 consumers, whom buy at most one unit of a product. Preferences are 
represented by a random utility model, in which product 𝑗 provides the following level of (indirect) 
utility to consumer 𝑛: 7 
 
 𝑈𝑗,𝑛 = 𝛽1,𝑛 𝑥1,𝑗 + 𝛽2,𝑛 𝑥2,𝑗 − 𝛼𝑛𝑝𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑛, (A.1) 
 
where 𝑥1,𝑗 and 𝑥2,𝑗 represent product characteristics that determine the quality of product 𝑗, 𝑝𝑗 is the 
price of product j and 𝜀𝑗,𝑛 is an idiosyncratic term related to both products and individuals. We 
assume that 𝑥1,𝑗 is a characteristic drawn from a continuous space, with distribution 𝐹𝑥1(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠). 
While the second characteristic is assumed to be a discrete one, with values 0 or 1, according to the 
distribution 𝐹2(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒). Moreover, note that all the parameters are specific to each individual, that is 
to say: 𝛽1.𝑛 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽1,𝑛 , 𝛽2.𝑛 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽2,𝑛 , and 𝛼𝑛 = 𝛼 + ?̃?𝑛, where 𝛽1,𝑛, 𝛽2,𝑛 and ?̃?𝑛 are random variables 
that follows the known distributions 𝐹?̃?1  , 𝐹?̃?2  and 𝐹?̃? , respectively. In addition, consumers face an 
outside option which gives them the following level of utility: 
 
 𝑈0,𝑛 = 𝑥0 + ?̃?0,𝑛 + 𝜀0,𝑛, (A.2) 
where the random term ?̃?0,𝑛  follows a known distribution as well, denoted by 𝐹𝑥0 . 
 
The supply side 
We consider 𝐹 firms and the set of products 𝐵, where each firm produces the subset of products (or 
brands) 𝐵𝑓. Thus the profits of firms are the following: 
 
 𝛱𝑓 = ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑗∈𝐵𝑓 = ∑ (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑗∈𝐵𝑓 𝑠𝑗(𝑝)𝑁, (A.3) 
                                                          
7 Note that this indirect utility function can be derived from a quasi-linear utility function. It does not contain income variable 
implicitly, because when consumers compare between different products (𝑈𝑗,𝑛 ⋚  𝑈𝑘,𝑛), the income variable vanishes. According 
to Nevo (2000), the quasi-linear assumption is only reasonable for some products. For instance, it would not be a good 
assumption for the car market, in which income effects should be taken into account. 
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where 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑐𝑗 and 𝑠𝑗 are the price, constant marginal cost and market share of product 𝑗 respectively. 
The variable 𝑝 is the vector of prices of all the brands in the market and 𝑁 is the number of potential 
consumers. Firms have complete information regarding the parameters 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛼 and the 
distributions of the random parameters are assumed to be common knowledge. 
Firms’ marginal costs are assumed to have the following form: 
 
 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛾1𝑥1,𝑗 + 𝛾2𝑥2,𝑗 + 𝜔𝑗), (A.4) 
 
There is a firm-specific cost component given by 𝜔𝑗. In addition, 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are common to all the firms 
in a given industry.  
 
Market Shares 
For a given vector of prices 𝑝 and assuming independence of consumer idiosyncrasies for product 
characteristics and the error term, the market share of product 𝑗 is given by the following expression: 
 
 𝑠𝑗(𝑝) = ∫ 𝑑𝐹(𝛽1, 𝛽2, ?̃?, ?̃?0, 𝜀) = ∫ 𝑑𝐹(𝛽1)𝐴𝑗𝐴𝑗
𝑑𝐹(𝛽2)𝑑𝐹(?̃?)𝑑𝐹(?̃?0)𝑑𝐹(𝜀), (A.5) 
 
with 𝐴𝑗 = {(𝛽1, 𝛽2, ?̃?, ?̃?0, 𝜀) | 𝑈𝑗,𝑛 ≥ 𝑈𝑙,𝑛}, for all 𝑙, denoting the set of consumers that choose product 𝑗. 
We assume that 𝜀 is distributed according to a Type I extreme-value distribution, so the error term can 
be integrated out giving rise to the well-known Logit probabilities.  
 
Timing of the game 
The timing of the game can be summarized as follows: 
1) Nature draws the underlying consumers’ preferences parameters (𝛼, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝑥0)  and firms’ 
common costs components (𝛾1, 𝛾2). 
2) Nature draws products characteristics (𝑥1,𝑗,𝑥2,𝑗) and each firm specific cost component (ω𝑗). 
3) Firms observe consumers’ preferences in 1), but they do not know consumers’ idiosyncratic 
tastes (?̃?𝑛, 𝛽1,𝑛, 𝛽2,𝑛, 𝜀?̃?,𝑗, ?̃?𝑛,0, 𝜀?̃?,0). Thus, conditionally on prices and provided that firms do 
know the distributions of idiosyncratic tastes, they can compute expected market shares. 
4) The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices is solved. 
5) Nature draws consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes (?̃?𝑛, 𝛽1,𝑛, 𝛽2,𝑛, 𝜀?̃?,𝑗, ?̃?𝑛,0, 𝜀?̃?,0). Then consumers 
observe prices and product characteristics and eventually make their choice. 
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Baseline simulations setting 
We replicated the baseline simulations setting used by Ivaldi and Lagos (2017), but only using their 
calibration number (12) in Table B.3 of Appendix B of this article. 
 
Parameter Baseline Setting 
𝐹 Number of firms is fixed to 5 for all the markets. Each firm produces only one product. 
𝑁 Number of consumers is set to 10,000 for all the markets. 
𝑁𝑆 Number of simulations for computing the expected market shares is fixed to 1,000. 
𝛼  
It is constant within each market, but it varies across markets with uniform distribution 
𝑈[0,3]. 
?̃?𝑛 
For a given market varies among consumers with exponential distribution 𝐸1
𝜎𝛼⁄
. 
The parameter 𝜎𝛼 is distributed uniformly 𝑈[0,7] across markets. 
𝛽1  
It is constant within each market, but it varies across markets with uniform distribution 
𝑈[0,4]. 
𝛽2  
It is constant within each market, but it varies across markets with uniform distribution 
𝑈[0,3]. 
?̃?1,𝑛, ?̃?2,𝑛 
For a given market both vary among consumers with normal distributions 𝑁[0,𝜎𝛽1]
 and 
𝑁[0,𝜎𝛽2]
, respectively. The parameters 𝜎𝛽1  and 𝜎𝛽2  are distributed uniformly 𝑈[0,5] across 
markets. 
𝜀?̃?,𝑗, 𝜀?̃?,0 
They are both drawn from an extreme value distribution 𝐹[𝜆], where the scale parameter 𝜆 
is equal to 0.5. 
𝑥1,𝑗  For each market 𝑥1,𝑗 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝜏 ∙ 𝜉𝑗) where 𝜏 = 0.3 and 𝜉𝑗 are distributed normally with 
𝑁[2,2]. 
𝑥2,𝑗 For each market 𝑥2,𝑗 = 𝐼(𝜂𝑗 > 0) where η𝑗 are distributed normally with 𝑁[0,1]. 
𝑥0 For each market 𝑥0 is drawn from a normal distribution 𝑁[0,4]. 
?̃?𝑛,0 
For a given market varies among consumers with normal distribution 𝑁[0,𝜎𝑥]. The 
parameter 𝜎𝑥 is distributed uniformly 𝑈[0,3] across markets. 
𝜔𝑗  For each market 𝜔𝑗  is drawn from a normal distribution 𝑁[0,0.05]. 
𝛾1, 𝛾2 
Both are fixed for each market, but they vary across markets with the same uniform 
distribution 𝑈[0,1]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
 
Computation of the actual percentage price increases motivated by PAC and computation 
of the ACPP 
The actual pre-merger price increase motivated by PAC and initiated by Firm 𝑖, denoted by  𝑆𝑖
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  , 
for 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 , is computed as follows: 
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 𝑆𝑖
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠
{𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑁(1 + 𝑠), 𝑝−𝑖
𝑁 ) + 𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠), 𝑝𝐵
𝑁(1 + 𝑠), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐵
𝑁 )
𝛿
1−𝛿
}, (B.1) 
 
where the superscript 𝑁 stands for Nash equilibrium price. 
While the actual post-merger percentage price increases initiated by the merged firm AC and 
Firm 𝐵, denoted by 𝑆𝐴𝐶
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  and 𝑆?̅?
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 , respectively, are obtained as: 
 
   𝑆𝐴𝐶
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠1
{𝜋𝐴(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝𝐶
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐶
𝑁 ) + 𝜋𝐶(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝𝐶
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐶
𝑁 )
+ 𝜋𝐴(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝𝐶
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝𝐵
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐶,−𝐵
𝑁 )
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝜋𝐶(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝𝐶
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝𝐵
𝑁(1 + 𝑠1), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐶,−𝐵
𝑁 )
𝛿
1 − 𝛿
}
− 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠2
{𝜋𝐴(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠2), 𝑝𝐶
𝑁(1 + 𝑠2), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐶
𝑁 )
1
1 − 𝛿
+ 𝜋𝐶(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠2), 𝑝𝐶
𝑁(1 + 𝑠2), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐶
𝑁 )
1
1 − 𝛿
}, 
 
 
(B.2) 
 
and, 
 
  𝑆?̅?
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠
{𝜋𝐵(𝑝𝐵
𝑁(1 + 𝑠), 𝑝−𝐵
𝑁 ) + 𝜋𝐵(𝑝𝐴
𝑁(1 + 𝑠), 𝑝𝐶
𝑁(1 + 𝑠), 𝑝𝐵
𝑁(1 + 𝑠), 𝑝−𝐴,−𝐶,−𝐵
𝑁 )
𝛿
1−𝛿
}. (B.3) 
 
 Note that, in Equation (B.2), 𝑠1 represents the percentage price increase that Firm 𝐴𝐶 would 
initiate, assuming that it will be matched by Firm 𝐶, while 𝑠2 is the percentage price increase that Firm 
𝐴𝐶 would unilaterally initiate. In addition, in Equations (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) is assumed that firms 
non-involved in PAC keep their prices at the Nash equilibrium level. 
The pre-merger ACPP is given by: 
 
 ACPPAB = min{SA
I,Acual, SB
I,Actual }. (B.4) 
 
The post-merger ACPP is given by: 
 ACPPAC,B = min{SAC
I,Actual, 𝑆?̅?
𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙}. (B.5) 
 
Finally, the impact of the merger on firms’ actual incentives to engage in PAC is given by: 
 
 ∆ACPPAC,B = ACPPAC,B − ACPPAB. (B.6) 
 
Appendix C – Tables 
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Table C.1 – Accuracy of the CPPI: predicting the sign of the change 
(Using 𝐃𝐀𝐂,𝐁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ to compute ?̅?𝐁
𝐈  in Equation 4) 
Diversion Ratio (DRCA) ∆ACPP ≤ 0% ∆ACPP > 0% 
Percentile Freq. Type-I error Freq. Type-II error 
25% 2,483 24.93% 9,040 12.99% 
50% 2,255 12.11% 9,268 15.66% 
75% 1,176 8.76% 10,347 29.71% 
100% 343 23.91% 11,181 41.99% 
Total 6,257 17.21% 39,836 26.09% 
 
Table C.2 – Accuracy of the CPPI: predicting a significant variation of the ACPP 
(Using 𝐃𝐀𝐂,𝐁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ to compute ?̅?𝐁
𝐈  in Equation 4) 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C / Firm 
A) 
∆ACPP < 5% ∆ACPP ≥ 5% 
Percentiles Freq. Type-I error Freq. Type-II error 
25% 8,453 0.89% 3,070 54.07% 
50% 9,420 0.93% 2,103 68.19% 
75% 9,832 0.49% 1,691 83.68% 
100% 8,990 0.37% 2,534 96.80% 
Total 36,695 0.66% 9,398 74.08% 
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